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by David Radlett 
This may appear to be a gloomy question for the 
new millennium. However, it is one that must be 
addressed by those who recognise that a country 
which no longer controls its defence, its external 
relations nor vast parts of its economic and taxation 
policies has no real right to call itself a country. The 
steps taken in 1999 to bring these matters within the 
sphere of European Community competence do not 
need repeating here. They are enough to show that 
the Treaty of Amsterdam may be the last staging 
post for Britain on the road to European satrapy. 
The collective epitaph of the present government 
PD\ZHOOEH³:KHQ,DP dead and opened, you shall 
ILQGµ%UXVVHOV¶ O\LQJ LQP\KHDUW´7KHquestion is 
what might a future government be able to do 
reclaim Britain as a country. 
 
The most cogent response, short of withdrawal from 
the whole enterprise, is to seek a fundamental re-
negotiation of the terms of membership. Such re-
negotiation will demand strength and teeth.  
 
Strength, because the recent excoriation of William 
Hague when he suggested that further treaties might 
not be approved shows the strength of the Heseltine-
Blair axis, a kind of sad Greek chorus throwing up 
their hands as one in horror. Re-negotiation will 
require teeth, because there will be no support 
amongst the other 14 member statesi to abandon the 
progress so far towards the United States of Europe. 
 
About the only thing that may make the 14 think 
again is the threat that Britain may, indeed, 
withdraw from the whole enterprise. The shock-
wave from such withdrawal would threaten the 
whole project, and that would never do. 
 
It is in this connection that it is disturbing to discover 
that many Euro-realists do not believe in the 
possibility of withdrawal. One leading example is 
Sir Teddy Taylor, who wrote in the Guardian that: 
 
³, DP VXUH WKDW WKHUH ZLOO EH PDQ\ 
Eurosceptics who, having read this article 
thus far, will proclaim that such arguments 
are utter nonsense, that no British 
parliament can bind its successors, and that 
a decision to repeal the treaties would have 
a binding effect. Having spent my political 
life arguing against and voting against the 
Euro treaties, I wish that they were right 
and I was wrong. However, sadly, the right 
to repeal is VLPSO\ QRW WKHUH´ WK -XQH
1999) 
 
Sir Teddy uses Greenland to demonstrate this point, 
pointing out that their withdrawal was only possible 
through the permission of each of the Member States 
including the United Kingdom. Now, Greenland 
may best be described as an internally self-
governing part of Denmark. The association 
between Denmark and Greenland dates back to 
1721, culminating in full integration from May 
1953. Following a referendum in January 1979, 
Greenland attained home rule, with elections in 
April 1979 to the Landsting, WKH*UHHQODQGHUV¶QHZ
parliament. In the February 1982 referendum, the 
Greenlanders voted ± albeit by a narrow margin ± to 
withdraw from the European Community. Their 
withdrawal was completed by early 1985. 
 
What was at stake here was the change in status of 
an integral part of one of the Member States. 
Greenland still sends two representatives to the 
Danish Folketing, and the political caste in 
Denmark, despite the misgivings of many of the 
people it purports to represent, remains committed 
to EC membership. It was the reverse of the move 
presently being discussed by the Channel Islanders, 
some of whom are giving inexplicable yet serious 
consideration to moving to full membership of the 
EC through their connections with the United 
Kingdom. It is no great surprise that Greenland 
required a Treaty amendment, just as the Channel 
Islanders will require a Treaty amendment, if they 
cannot be persuaded to see the error of their ways. 
 
Neither Greenland nor the Channel Islands are full 
actors on the international stage. It follows that the 
Greenland experience does not provide an 
authoritative precedent to a Member State seeking 
the way outii. 
 
Sir Teddy rightly points to the provisions of Article 
 RI WKH 7UHDW\ RI 5RPH ³7KLV Treaty is 
concluded for an unlimited SHULRG´ZKLFKDSSHDUV
WRVXJJHVW³RQFHLQ DOZD\VLQ´7RKDYHWKLVHIIHFW
Article 312 must be read in conjunction with 
Articles 42 (2) and 56 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 1969 (Cmnd. 4818). 
 
Article 42 (2) provides: 
 
³7KH WHUPLQDWLRQ RI D WUHDW\ LWV
denunciation or the withdrawal of a party, 
may take place only as a result of the 
application of the provisions of the treaty 
or of the present &RQYHQWLRQ«´ 
 
Article 56 of the Vienna Convention provides, so 
far as is material: 
 
³$ WUHDW\ ZKLFK FRQWDLQV QR SURYLVLRQ
regarding its termination and which does 
not provide for denunciation or withdrawal 
is not subject to denunciation or 
withdrawal unless (a) it is established that 
the parties intended to admit the possibility 
of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) a 
right of denunciation or withdrawal may be 
LPSOLHGE\WKHQDWXUHRIWKHWUHDW\«´ 
 
As none of the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty of 
Accession nor the European Communities Act 1972 
purport on their face to revoke parliamentary 
sovereignty, at least one party to the Treaty (the 
United Kingdom) might be taken to have admitted 
the possibility of denunciation or withdrawaliii. 
 
In any event, Article 312 might be interpreted as 
indicating nothing more than a free parking sign: no 
time limit, but no compulsion either.iv 
 
Of greater importance, perhaps, to the survival of 
Britain is the statement of international law found in 
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. This 
records that, inter alia, the purposes of the United 
Nations are: 
 
³« WR GHYHORS IULHQGO\ UHODWLRQV DPRQJ
nations based on respect for the principles 
of equal rights and self-determination of 
SHRSOHV«´ 
 
The right to self-determination was further defined 
in Article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966): 
 
³$OO SHRSOHV KDYH WKH ULJKW RI VHOI-
determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and 
FXOWXUDOGHYHORSPHQW´ 
 
This creates a conflict between norms at 
international law: no withdrawal set against the right 
to self-determination. In these circumstances, the 
United Kingdom Parliament may pursue whichever 
option is most desired. The only caveat to this 
proposition is that there must have been no 
abrogation of the power to choose as a matter of 
English law.v 
 
The traditional view of parliamentary sovereignty 
HPEUDFHV 3DUOLDPHQW¶V DELOLW\ WR UHYHUVH WKH
European Communities Act 1972. No 1972 Act 
means no EC membership. If the alternative view is 
taken, that the self-embracing sovereignty of 
Parliament means that one Parliament may bind a 
successor, then the question is whether the 1972 Act 
has the effect of altering permanently the 
constitutional standing of the United Kingdom 
Parliament. Lord Hoffman has discussed the effect 
of the 1972 Act in two interesting cases. In Stoke 




country, taking precedence over Acts of 
Parliament. Our entry into the European 
Economic Community meant that (subject 
to our undoubted but probably theoretical 
right to withdraw from the Community 
altogether) Parliament surrendered its 
sovereign right to legislate contrary to the 
provisions of the Treaty on matters of 
social and economic policy which it 
UHJXODWHG´ 
 
He put flesh on the meaning of this statement in R -
v- Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte 




rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and 
restrictions from time to time created or 
DULVLQJE\RUXQGHUWKH7UHDWLHV«DVLQ
accordance with the Treaties are without 
further enactment to be given legal effect 
or used in the United Kingdom shall be 
recognised and available in law, and be 
enforced, allowed and followed 
DFFRUGLQJO\«¶´ 
 
That, in a nut-shell, is the extent of supremacy of EC 
law. It is supreme because section 2 (1) says so, 
bolstered by section 3, which gives legal effect to the 
often demented ramblings of the European Court of 
Justice.vi But what of section 2 (4), which provides 
in full that: 
 
³7KH SURYLVLRQ WKDW PD\ EH PDGH XQGHU
subsection (2) above includes, subject to 
schedule 2 to this Act, any such provision 
(of any such extent) as may be made by Act 
of Parliament, and any enactment passed or 
to be passed, other than one contained in 
this Part of this Act, shall be construed and 
have effect subject to the foregoing 
provisions of this section but, except as 
may be provided by any Act passed after 
this Act, Schedule 2shall have effect in 
connection with the powers conferred by 
this and the following sections of this Act 
to make Orders in Council and 
UHJXODWLRQV´ 
 
7DNLQJ WKHDUJXPHQW VWHSE\ VWHS WKHZRUGV ³WKH
provision that may be made under subsection (2) 
above includes, subject to schedule 2 to this Act, any 
such provision (of any such extent) as may be made 
E\$FWRI3DUOLDPHQW´VLPSO\FRQILUPWKHPHWKRGE\
which any Community obligation can be enacted 
into United Kingdom law. Subsection (2) allows for 
this to be done by Statutory Instrument (subject to 
limitations in Schedule 2 to the Act concerning, 
inter alia, proposals to impose or increase taxation 
or to legislate retrospectively, which must be done 
by Act of Parliament). In other words, subsection (4) 
thus far underlines that, such exceptions aside, a 
Statutory Instrument made under the 1972 Act will 
suffice to enact Community law. 
 
Moving on to the critiFDO ZRUGV ³« DQG any 
enactment passed or to be passed, other than one 
contained in this Part of this Act, shall be construed 
and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions 
RIWKLVVHFWLRQ«´ the leading constitutional experts 
de Smith and Brasier pose this question: 
 
³6XUHO\ WKLV LV QRW D PHUH UXOH RI 
construction, to be displaced if the Act and 
WKHUHJXODWLRQFDQQRWEHKDUPRQLVHG´GH 
Smith & Brazier, Constitutional and 
AdministrativeLaw, Penguin (6th Ed) at p 
80). 
 
In the Seymour-Smith case, Lord Hoffman suggests 
exactly that. It is a mere rule of construction, 
meaning no more than: 
 
³«GRPHVWLFOHJLVODWLRQLVWRKDYHHIIHFW 
subject to such European rights or 
UHVWULFWLRQV µDV LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH 
Treaties are without further enactment to 




The de Smith and Brasier argument was that the 
³SDVVHG RU WR EH SDVVHG´ SKUDVH referred to all 
subsequent Acts of Parliament, which must take 
effect subject to the 1972 Act. Lord Hoffman shows 
the limit to this proposition, and the closing words 
of the sub-section give the lie to the claim that the 
words have the additional effect of entrenching any 
of these things in the sense that the Act itself cannot 
be repealed: 
 
i Now 27 in number (excluding the UK). 
³«EXWH[FHSWDVPD\EHSURYLGHGE\ any 
Act passed after this Act, Schedule 2 shall 
have effect in connection with the powers 
conferred by this and the following 
sections of this Act to make Orders in 
Council and regulations´ 
 
In other words, the power to make regulations is 
governed by Schedule 2, which may itself be 
amended. Now, either the 1972 Act is capable of 
amendment (and ex hypothesi, repeal) by a 
subsequent Parliament or it is not. As the concluding 
words of subsection (4) clearly envisage that 
Schedule 2 can be amended, there seems to be little 
reason to suppose that the whole of the Act could not 
be so amended or repealed. Repeal is simply an 
extreme form of amendment. 
 
Even if the view of Lord Hoffman, and the plainest 
meaning of section 2 (4) read in its entirety are not 
enough, the meaning of s 2 (4) is at best obscure. 
There is clear authority for the proposition that 
constitutional change cannot happen by accident or 
through ambiguity. In Chorlton -v- Lings (1868) 
LR 4 CP 374, it was argued that, had Parliament 
intended to make a µGUDVWLF¶ FKDQJH WR WKH
constitution (allowing women to vote), it ³«ZRXOG 
KDYHVDLGVRSODLQO\DQGGLVWLQFWO\´ 
 
Again, in Nairn -v- University of St Andrews 
[1909] AC 147 H/L, it was held that there would 
have to be the most explicit of statutory language to 
create a change to the constitution. Lord Loreburn 
LC observed: 
 
³,W ZRXOG UHTXLUH D FRQYLQFLQJ
demonstration to satisfy me that Parliament 
intended to effect a constitutional change 
so momentous and far-reaching by so 
furtive a SURFHVV´ 
 
The judicial condemnation of making µGUDVWLF¶




There are strong arguments to suggest that, as a 
matter of law, the legal position as to the sovereignty 
of Parliament is secure at both national and 
international levels. The ³WHHWK´ KDYH QRW ± yet ± 
decayed beyond use. 
 
The sole question is whether the successors to the 
present government will have the bite to use them. 
 
David Radlett is a Lecturer in Law at Mid Kent 
College of Higher and Further Education. He is 
a regular contributor to the Journal. 
                                                          
                                                                                    
ii This is the current position of Scotland, also. It is 
the government at Westminster which is 
responsible for the representation of Scotland in 
international law. See Sch. 5 para 7 Scotland Act 
 ? ? ? ?  ?ĂƐ ĂŵĞŶĚĞĚ ? ?  ?International relations, 
including relations with territories outside the 
United Kingdom, the [European Union](and their 
institutions) and other international organisations, 
regulation of international trade, and international 
development assistance and co-operation are 
ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ? ?
iii Denunciation or withdrawal is now explicitly 
recognised in Article 50 Treaty on European Union 
(as amended). Worth remembering in the context 
of current (June 2016) discussions that the two-
year period mentioned in Article 50 is a maximum 
period, not a minimum one. 
iv The better position is probably that old Article 312 
simply served to distinguish the initial EEC Treaty 
1957 from, for example, the European Coal and 
Steel Community Treaty 1952, which was 
concluded for a period of 50 years. 
v The self-determination argument remains of 
interest as a riposte to those who are currently 
(June 2016) seeking to ignore the wish of the 
people of the United Kingdom as expressed in the 
referendum held on 23rd June 2016.  
vi This point (the contingency of EU law on ECA 
1972) has since been expressly confirmed by Sir 
John Laws in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council 
[2003] Q.B. 151. 
